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FINDING ALL NASH EQUILIBRIA OF A FINITE GAME USING
POLYNOMIAL ALGEBRA
RUCHIRA S. DATTA
Abstract. The set of Nash equilibria of a finite game is the set of nonnega-
tive solutions to a system of polynomial equations. In this survey article we
describe how to construct certain special games and explain how to find all
the complex roots of the corresponding polynomial systems, including all the
Nash equilibria. We then explain how to find all the complex roots of the
polynomial systems for arbitrary generic games, by polyhedral homotopy con-
tinuation starting from the solutions to the specially constructed games. We
describe the use of Gro¨bner bases to solve these polynomial systems and to
learn geometric information about how the solution set varies with the payoff
functions. Finally, we review the use of the Gambit software package to find
all Nash equilibria of a finite game.
1. Introduction
The set of Nash equilibria of a finite game is the set of nonnegative solutions to
a system of polynomial equations. In this article we introduce this point of view
and survey the computational methods for finding Nash equilibria using polynomial
algebra which are available to game theorists today. We give examples which we
hope will enable game theorists to find all Nash equilibria of games of relatively
larger formats. When we know only a subset of the Nash equilibria of a game, we
have a rather shaky foundation for making predictions about what could happen
in repeated trials of the game, since play may converge toward a Nash equilibrium
which is not in the subset. Knowing all the Nash equilibria of a game will help us
to make more principled predictions.
2. The System of Polynomial Equations
A monomial in n variables x1, . . . , xn is an expression of the form x
d1
1 . . . x
dn
n for
some nonnegative integers d1, . . . , dn. It is squarefree if di ≤ 1 for all i. The degree
in xi of this monomial is di, and its total degree is
∑n
i=1 di. The product of two
monomials xd11 . . . x
dn
n and x
e1
1 . . . x
en
n is x
d1+e1
1 . . . x
dn+en
n .
A polynomial in n variables x1, . . . , xn with coefficients in a field K is a finite
sum of terms. Each term is of the form cm for some c ∈ K and some monomial
m in x1, . . . , xn. The set of polynomials in n variables is a vector space whose
basis is the set of monomials in n variables. Since we can also multiply monomials
together, we can extend this multiplication to define a product on the space of
polynomials, using commutativity, associativity, and distributivity. This makes the
set of polynomials in n variables with coefficients in K into a commutative ring,
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and the study of such objects is the subject of commutative algebra. A field is a
commutative ring in which every nonzero element has a multiplicative inverse.
We can evaluate a polynomial f =
∑
cd1...dnx
d1
1 · · ·x
dn
n at a point (a1, . . . , an) ∈
Kn by substituting a1, . . . , an for the variables x1, . . . , xn respectively, obtaining an
expression
∑
cd1...dna
d1
1 · · · a
dn
n and carrying out all the multiplications and addi-
tions in the field K. We denote the resulting element of K as f(a1, . . . , an).
A polynomial equation is an expression f = g for some polynomials f and g.
A point a ∈ Kn satisfies this equation if f(a) = g(a). Since this is equivalent to
f(a) − g(a) = 0, we can always write a polynomial equation as p = 0 for some
polynomial p. A point satisfying this equation is called a root of p. A polynomial
in one variable with coefficients in K need not have any roots in K. But there is
always a field containing K, called the algebraic closure K¯ of K, such that every
nonconstant univariate polynomial with coefficients in K¯ has a root in K¯. The field
of complex numbers is the algebraic closure of the field of real numbers.
The multiplicity of a root of a polynomial denotes how many linear factors of
that polynomial vanish at that root. (Every polynomial factorizes into linear factors
over the algebraic closure of its coefficient field.) For example, the multiplicity of
the root 1 of the polynomial (x−1)2 is 2. A polynomial equation of degree d in one
variable has d complex roots (counted with multiplicity); this is the Fundamental
Theorem of Algebra.
A system of polynomial equations in n variables over K is a finite set of polyno-
mial equations in n variables over K, and a point in Kn satisfies, or is a root of,
this system if it satisfies all the constituent equations. The study of solution sets
of polynomial systems is called algebraic geometry. Recent years have seen a re-
naissance in computational algebraic geometry; the interested reader is referred for
example to [4]. The subsequent volume [5] contains more information, particularly
about finding the roots of polynomial systems. The book [24] surveys techniques for
solving polynomial systems and includes a chapter on finding Nash equilibria. [8]
is a recent summary of the state of the art of solving polynomial systems. [23] ex-
plains numerical algebraic geometry and is written for a general technical audience
(rather than a mathematical one).
We now fix the game-theoretic notation we shall use. The concepts we describe
here can be found in a standard game theory text such as [21]. A normal form
game with a finite number of players, each with a finite number of pure strategies,
is specified as follows. The set of players is denoted as I = {1, . . . , N}. Associated
to the players are finite disjoint sets of pure strategies S1, . . . , SN . We require that
|Si| ≥ 2 for each i. Write S =
∏
i∈I Si for the set of pure strategy profiles. For
each i let di = |Si| − 1, and write the set Si as {si0, . . . , sidi}. So a pure strategy
profile s ∈ S can be written as s = (s1, . . . , sN ), where for each i, we have si = sij
for some j with 0 ≤ j ≤ di. Let D =
∑
i∈I (|Si| − 1). So
∑
i∈I |Si| = D + N .
The set Σi of mixed strategies of player i is the set of all functions σi : Si → [0, 1]
with
∑di
j=0 σi(sij) = 1. Write Σ =
∏
i∈I Σi for the set of strategy profiles. Write
Σ−i =
∏
j∈I−{i} Σj . We will call an element of Σ−i a (−i)-strategy profile. Write
S−i =
∏
j∈I−{i} Sj . We will call an element of S−i a pure (−i)-strategy profile.
Write σ−i for the image of σ ∈ Σ under the projection pi−i onto Σ−i. Write σij =
σi(sij) for j = 0, . . . , di. A game format is a specification of a number of players
N and the number of pure strategies each player has, specified by the numbers
d1, . . . , dN . Without loss of generality we can require that d1 ≥ d2 ≥ · · · ≥ dN .
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The game is specified by describing the payoff function ui : S → R for each player.
The ith player’s expected payoff from a strategy profile σ is given by multilinearity
as
ui(σ) =
∑
s∈S
ui(s)σ1(s1) · · ·σN (sN ).
By abuse of notation, write ui(σi, σ−i) for the ith player’s expected payoff from the
strategy σ whose ith component is σi and whose other components are defined by
pi−i(σ) = σ−i.
A mixed strategy σ∗i of player i is a best response to the (−i)-strategy profile
σ−i if for every mixed strategy σi of player i, we have ui(σ
∗
i , σ−i) ≥ ui(σi, σ−i). A
strategy profile σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i, the mixed strategy σ∗i
is a best response to σ∗−i.
We can rewrite the expected payoff to player i as follows:
ui(σi, σ−i) =
∑
s∈S
ui(si, s−i)σ1(s1) · · ·σN (sN )
=
∑
si∈Si
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(si, s−i)σ1(s1) · · ·σN (sN )
=
∑
si∈Si
σi(si)
∑
s−i∈S−i
ui(si, s−i)σ1(s1) · · ·σi−1(si−1)σi+1(si+1) · · ·σN (sN )
=
di∑
j=0
σij
∑
s−i∈Si
ui(sij , σ−i).
We see that the function ui(sij , σ−i) is a polynomial with real-valued coefficients.
For each s−i = (s1j1 , . . . , s(i−1)ji−1 , s(i+1)ji+1 , . . . , sNjN ) ∈ S−i, the contribution to
ui(sij , σ−i) from the outcome (sij , s−i) is the squarefree monomial
σ1j1 · · ·σ(i−1)ji−1σ(i+1)ji+1 · · ·σNjN
(which may be interpreted as the conditional probability that the outcome will
occur, given that player i chooses pure strategy sij), multiplied by the real-valued
coefficient ui(sij , s−i) (the payoff to player i for that outcome). The following
proposition describes the system of polynomial equations whose nonnegative solu-
tions give the Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1. The sequence of real numbers
(σ10, . . . , σ1d1 , . . . , σN0, . . . , σNdN )
constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if for some sequence of real numbers
(v10, . . . , v1d1 , . . . , vN0, . . . , vNdN ),
the σij ’s and vij ’s satisfy the following system (∗) of 2(D+N) polynomial equations
in 2(D +N) unknowns:
ui(sij , σ−i) + vij = ui(si0, σ−i) + vi0 for each i ∈ I and for j = 1, . . . , di,
σijvij = 0 for each i ∈ I and for j = 0, . . . , di,
di∑
j=0
σij = 1 for each i ∈ I,
and all the σij’s and vij ’s are nonnegative.
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Proof. =⇒: Suppose σ is a Nash equilibrium. Certainly all the σij ’s are nonnegative
and
∑di
j=0 σij = 1 for each i ∈ I. For each i ∈ I and j = 0, . . . , di, let vij =
ui(σ)−ui(sij , σ−i). Then vij ≥ 0 since σi is a best response to σ−i. The quantities
ui(sij , σ−i) + vij are all equal to ui(σ) and hence to each other.
It remains to show that σijvij = 0. If σij = 1, then ui(σ) = ui(sij , σ−i) and
vij = 0, so we may assume σij < 1. Define σ
∗
i by σ
∗
ij = 0 and
σ∗il =
σil
1− σij
for l 6= j
Clearly σ∗il ≥ 0, and
di∑
l=0
σ∗il =
∑di
l=0
l 6=j
σil
1− σij
=
1− σij
1− σij
= 1.
Then
ui(σ
∗
i , σ−i) =
di∑
l=0
σ∗ilui(sil, σ−i)
=
di∑
l=0
l 6=j
σil
1− σij
ui(sil, σ−i)
=
(
di∑
l=0
σil
1− σij
ui(sil, σ−i)
)
−
σij
1− σij
ui(sij , σ−i)
=
1
1− σij
ui(σ)−
σij
1− σij
ui(sij , σ−i)
= ui(σ) +
σij
1− σij
(ui(σ)− ui(sij , σ−i))
= ui(σ) +
σijvij
1− σij
,
so σijvij = 0 since σi is a best response to σ−i.
⇐=: Suppose the σij ’s and vij ’s are nonnegative and satisfy the polynomial system.
Let σ be the strategy profile defined by σi(sij) = σij . Fix a player i and suppose σ
′
i
is a mixed strategy of player i. Then
∑di
j=0
(
σ′ij − σij
)
= 0, so there must be some
j for which σ′ij − σij ≥ 0. Without loss of generality suppose that σ
′
i0 − σi0 ≥ 0.
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Then
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) =
di∑
j=0
(σij − σ
′
ij)ui(sij , σ−i)
=
di∑
j=0
(σij − σ
′
ij) (ui(sij , σ−i)− ui(si0, σ−i))
=
di∑
j=1
(σij − σ
′
ij)(vi0 − vij)
= ((1− σi0)− (1− σ
′
i0)) vi0 +
di∑
j=1
σ′ijvij
= (σ′i0 − σi0)vi0 +
di∑
j=1
σ′ijvij ≥ 0.
Thus σ is a best response to σ−i for each i, and σ is a Nash equilibrium. 
We call the vij ’s complementary slack variables. If vij > 0, that is, the payoff
ui(sij , σ−i) to player i for strategy sij is strictly less than the equilibrium payoff
ui(σ), then σij = 0, that is strategy sij cannot be a component of the mixed
strategy of player i. Conversely, if σij > 0 (which must hold for some j), then the
payoff to player i of pure strategy sij must equal the equilibrium payoff.
3. What Kind of Geometric Object Is The Set of Nash Equilibria?
Thus the set of Nash equilibria is the set of real solutions to a system of polynomial
equations and inequalities with real coefficients. Inequalities can only be defined
over ordered sets; the field of complex numbers, for example, is not ordered. A set
of real points given by a system of polynomial equations and inequalities is called
a semialgebraic variety, and the special case when the system does not involve
inequalities is called a real algebraic variety. Thus the set of Nash equilibria of
a game is a semialgebraic variety. Real algebraic geometry is the study of real
algebraic varieties and semialgebraic varieties. This area of algebraic geometry has
many features of special interest (quite apart from its usefulness in applications).
(For example, over the real numbers any system of equations f1 = 0, . . . , fn = 0 is
equivalent to a single equation f21 + f
2
2 + · · ·+ f
2
n = 0.) It so happens that Nash’s
contribution to real algebraic geometry was seminal, although he did not relate it
to game theory. The two main references for real algebraic geometry are [3] and
[1].
The set of points in the plane with x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0 is the nonnegative quadrant,
the set of points in 3-space with x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, and z ≥ 0 is the nonnegative octant,
and similarly the set of points in Rn all of whose coordinates are nonnegative is
the nonnegative orthant. In this case, the inequalities state simply that we are
interested in those solutions to the polynomial system which lie in the nonnegative
orthant.
In the system (∗) of polynomial equations, we can substitute each σij with ρ
2
ij and
each vij with r
2
ij , where the ρij ’s and the rij ’s are new unknowns. This induces a new
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system (∗∗) of polynomial equations in the ρij ’s and rij ’s. (For example, ρ
2
ijr
2
ij = 0,∑di
j=0 ρ
2
ij = 1, and so forth.) Each real-valued solution to (∗∗) corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium, since σij = ρ
2
ij and vij = r
2
ij automatically satisfy the nonnegativity
constraints. However, there may be up to 2D+N solutions to (∗∗) for each Nash
equilibrium, since if σij is positive we can set each ρij equal to either its positive
or negative square root, and similarly for vij .
A transformation of a set X is a 1-1 correspondence of X with itself. A group
of transformations is a set G of transformations such that for each transformation
in G, its inverse transformation is also in G, and for each pair of transformations
in G, their composition is also in G. We consider the composition of two transfor-
mations in G to be their product in G. (Note that this product is not necessarily
commutative.) We say that the group of transformations acts on the set X which
it transforms. Given any set T of transformations {g1, . . . , gn}, we can form the
group generated by the generators g1, . . . , gn by taking all products of elements of
T and their inverses. An orbit of the group action is the set of images of a single
point in X under all the transformations in G. Every point in an orbit is the image
of every other point under some transformation in G. To form the quotient of X
by G, we can take one point from each orbit.
Each (n− 1)-dimensional hyperplane in Rn defines a special transformation, the
reflection which takes each point in Rn to its opposite point on the other side
of the hyperplane. In particular, the transformation of R2(D+N) which takes ρij
into −ρij and leaves all other coordinates unchanged is a coordinate reflection,
as is the one which takes rij into −rij . A group of transformations generated
by reflections is called a reflection group. In particular, let G be the group of
transformations generated by the aforementioned coordinate reflections. Then for
any transformation g ∈ G, for any real-valued solution (ρ, r) of (∗∗), its image g(ρ, r)
also satisfies (∗∗). Indeed, g simply changes the signs of some of the coordinates
of (ρ, r). Thus the set of real-valued solutions to (∗∗) is a symmetric real algebraic
variety V , with G as its group of symmetries.
We can take the quotient of V by G by, for example, considering only those points
of V lying in the nonnegative orthant. The group G takes this orthant to each other
orthant. There is exactly one point of V in the nonnegative orthant for each Nash
equilibrium, obtained by taking the nonnegative square root of each coordinate
of the Nash equilibrium. So the set of Nash equilibria is the quotient of a real
algebraic variety by a reflection group. In fact, any semialgebraic variety defined by
a system of polynomial equations and inequalities in which none of the inequalities
are strict, is also the quotient of a real algebraic variety by a reflection group. For
each inequality constraint f(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ 0, we can define a new variable v and
change the inequality constraint into two constraints f(x1, . . . , xn) − v = 0 and
v ≥ 0, then proceed as above.
4. Eliminating The Complementary Slack Variables
Fix a player i ∈ I, a pure strategy sij ∈ Si of player i, and a pure strategy sklk ∈ Sk
for every other player k ∈ I − {i}, giving a pure (−i)-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i.
Then the system (∗) implies that
ui(sij , σ−i) + vij = ui(si0, σ−i) + vi0.
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Multiplying through by
∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk ,
which we denote by p(s−i), and using that σkmkvkmk = 0, we find that
ui(sij , s−i) ∏
k∈I−{i}
σklk + vij

 ∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk
=

ui(si0, s−i) ∏
k∈I−{i}
σklk + vi0

 ∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk .
Every other term in ui(sij , σ−i) is killed by one or more of the vkmk ’s, and similarly
for ui(si0, σ−i. Next we substitute 1 −
∑dk
mk=0
mk 6=lk
σkmk for σklk in each factor of
the product
∏
k∈I−{i} σklk , and note that every nonconstant term in the resulting
polynomial is also killed by one or more of the vkmk ’s. Finally, we have
(vij − vi0 + ui(sij , s−i)− ui(si0, s−i))
∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk = 0,
an equation involving only the complementary slack variables. Clearly, for this
equation to hold, either vij − vi0 + ui(sij , s−i) − ui(si0, s−i) or one of the vkmk ’s
must vanish.
In this way we obtain a system of equations in the vij ’s, which we denote by
(V). Denote by (Vi) the subsystem corresponding to fixing player i above, and by
(Vi,s−i) the subsystem corresponding to fixing player i and the pure (−i)-strategy
profile s−i.
If p(s−i) 6= 0 for some s−i ∈ S−i, then the system of equations (Vi,s−i ) reduces
to vij = vi0 + ui(si0, s−i)− ui(sij , s−i) for each j = 1, . . . , di. The solutions to this
system along with the nonnegativity constraints vij ≥ 0 lie along a ray parametrized
by vi0, with
vi0 ≥
di
max
j=0
(ui(sij , s−i)− ui(si0, s−i)) .
Only for those j = 0, . . . , d1 at which ui(sij , s−i)−ui(si0, s−i) attains its maximum
can vij ever vanish; the rest of the vij ’s must be positive. But since
∑di
j=0 σij = 1
with σij ≥ 0, at least one σij must be positive, and thus since σijvij = 0 for all
j, at least one vij must vanish. Therefore we have a unique solution, the point
with vi0 = max
di
j=0 (ui(sij , s−i)− ui(si0, s−i)). Let us denote this point by q(s−i) ∈
R
di+1
≥0 .
For generic games, the point q(s−i) corresponding to s−i will be different from
the point q(s′−i) corresponding to s
′
−i for any other s
′
−i ∈ S−i. Thus the system
(Vi) reduces to the following |S−i|+ 1 alternatives: either
p(s−i) = 0 for all s−i ∈ S−i, (V
p
i )
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or for some s∗−i ∈ S−i, we have the system (V
s∗−i
i ):
p(s−i) = 0 for all s−i ∈ S−i − {s
∗
−i}, (V
s∗−ip
i )
and
(vi0, . . . , vidi) = q(s
∗
−i). (V
s∗−iq
i )
For generic games, exactly one of the vij ’s will vanish at the point q(s
∗
−i).
We now introduce some notation from logic. The symbol ∧ means “and” and
the symbol ∨ means “or” (in the Boolean sense). Suppose ϕ0 and ϕ1 are Boolean
expressions. Then the expression ϕ0 ∧ϕ1, meaning “ϕ0 and ϕ1”, is the conjunction
of ϕ0 and ϕ1. The expression ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1, meaning “ϕ0 or ϕ1”, is the disjunction of
ϕ0 and ϕ1. Suppose ϕ0, . . . , ϕn are Boolean expressions. Then
∧n
i=0 ϕi denotes the
conjunction of ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, and
∨n
i=0 ϕi denotes the disjunction of ϕ0, . . . , ϕn. The
distributive law holds for conjunction and disjunction just as it holds for multipli-
cation and addition.
Lemma 2. The solutions of the system (Vpi ) are given by
N∨
k=1
k 6=i
dk∨
j=0
dk∨
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number N of players. First suppose N = 2.
Without loss of generality, fix i = 2. Then each s−i is s1j for some j. The equation
(Vp2,s1j ) is p(s1j) =
∏d1
l=0
l 6=j
v1l = 0, which holds if and only if
∨d1
l=0
l 6=j
(v1l = 0). So
the system (Vp2) holds if and only if
∧d1
j=0
∨d1
l=0
l 6=j
(v1l = 0). We show by induction
on d1 that this expression is equal to
∨d1
j=0
∨d1
l=1
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0) which equals∨2
k=1
k 6=2
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0). For d1 = 1,
1∧
j=0
1∨
l=0
l 6=j
(v1l = 0) =
1∧
j=0
(
v1(1−j) = 0
)
= (v11 = 0) ∧ (v10 = 0)
=
1∨
j=0
∨
l=1
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0)
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Now assume that
∧d1
j=1
∨d1
l=1
l 6=j
(v1l = 0) =
∨d1
j=1
∨d1
l=2
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0). Then
d1∧
j=0
d1∨
l=0
l 6=j
(v1l = 0) =
( d1∨
l=1
(v1l = 0)
)
∧
d1∧
j=1
d1∨
l=0
l 6=j
(v1l = 0)
=
( d1∨
l=1
(v1l = 0)
)
∧
d1∧
j=1
(
(v10 = 0) ∨
d1∨
l=1
l 6=j
(v1l = 0)
)
=
( d1∨
l=1
(v1l = 0)
)
∧
(
(v10 = 0) ∨
d1∧
j=1
d1∨
l=1
l 6=j
(v1l = 0)
)
=
( d1∨
l=1
(v1l = 0)
)
∧
(
(v10 = 0) ∨
d1∨
j=1
d1∨
l=2
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0)
)
=
( d1∨
l=1
(v10 = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0)
)
∨
(( d1∨
l=1
(v1l = 0)
)
∧
d1∨
j=1
(
(v1j = 0) ∧
( d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1l = 0)
)))
=
( 0∨
j=0
d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0)
)
∨
(( d1∨
j=1
(v1j = 0)
)
∧
d1∨
j=1
(
(v1j = 0) ∧
( d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1l = 0)
)))
=
( 0∨
j=0
d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0)
)
∨
d1∨
j=1
(
(v1j = 0) ∧
( d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1l = 0)
))
=
di∨
j=0
d1∨
l=1
l>j
(v1j = 0) ∧ (v1l = 0) .
Now assume the lemma holds for any number of players less than N . Fix i ∈
I−{N}. Suppose that
∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0)∧ (vkl = 0) holds. Fix n ∈ I−{i}
and j,m ∈ Sn with j 6= m such that vnj = 0 and vnm = 0. Consider a pure strategy
sklk ∈ Sk for every player k ∈ I−{1}, giving a pure (−1)-strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i.
The equation (Vpi,s−i ) is
p(s−i) =
∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk = 0.
Either ln = j, in which case the product vanishes since it includes vnm; or ln = m,
in which case the product vanishes since it includes vnj ; or snln ∈ Sn−{snj , snm},
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in which case the product vanishes since it includes both vnj and vnm. Thus the
equation (Vpi,s−i) holds. So the system (V
p
i ) is satisfied.
Conversely, suppose the system (Vpi ) holds. If there exist j,m ∈ SN with j 6= m
such that vNj = 0 and vNm = 0, then
∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) holds,
so assume there do not exist such j,m ∈ SN . Then there exists j ∈ SN such
that vNm 6= 0 for all sNm ∈ SN − {sNj}. Write S
′
−i =
∏
k∈I−{i,N} Sk. Consider
all elements of S−i given by pure strategies sklk ∈ Sk for k ∈ I − {i, N} and
sNlN = sNj ∈ SN . Thus s−i has the form s−i = (s
′
−i, sNj) for some s
′
i ∈ S
′
i. The
equation (Vpi,s−i) is
p(s−i) =
∏
k∈I−{i}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk =
( ∏
k∈I−{i,N}
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk
)
dN∏
m=0
m 6=j
vNm = 0.
Since vNm 6= 0 for all sNm ∈ SN − {sNj}, this equation is equivalent to the
equation p(s′−i) =
∏
k∈I−{i,N}
∏dk
mk=0
mk 6=lk
vkmk = 0. By the induction hypothe-
sis, these equations imply that
∨N−1
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) holds. Thus∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) holds. 
Lemma 3. Fix i ∈ I and fix pure strategies sklk ∈ Sk for each k ∈ I−{i}, defining
a (−i)-strategy profile s∗−i ∈ S−i. Then the solutions of the system (V
s∗−ip
i ) are
given by
N∧
k=1
k 6=i
(vklk = 0) ∨
N∨
k=1
k 6=i
dk∨
j=0
dk∨
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) .
Proof. Suppose
∧N
k=1
k 6=i
(vklk = 0) ∨
∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) holds. If
N∨
k=1
k 6=i
dk∨
j=0
dk∨
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0)
holds, then by Lemma 2, the system (Vpi ) holds so a fortiori the system (V
s∗−ip
i )
holds. Suppose
∧N
k=1
k 6=i
(vklk = 0) holds. Let s−i ∈ S−i − {s
∗
−i} with components
sknk ∈ Sk. Then
p(s−i) =
N∏
k=1
k 6=i
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=nk
vkmk .
Since s−i 6= s
∗
−i, there is some k ∈ I − {i} such that nk 6= lk. Then vklk appears in
the product, and so p(s−i) = 0. So the system (V
s∗−ip
i ) holds.
Conversely, suppose
∧N
k=1
k 6=i
(vklk = 0)∨
∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0)∧(vkl = 0) does
not hold. Since
∧N
k=1
k 6=i
(vklk = 0) does not hold, there is some k
′ ∈ I −{i} such that
vk′lk′ 6= 0. Also since
∨N
k=1
k 6=i
∨dk
j=0
∨dk
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) does not hold, for each
k ∈ I − {i}, either vkj 6= 0 for all skj ∈ Sk, or vknk = 0 for a single sknk ∈ Sk and
vkmk 6= 0 for all mk with skmk ∈ Sk −{sknk}. In either case, there is some nk with
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sknk ∈ Sk such that vkmk 6= 0 for all mk with skmk ∈ Sk−{sknk}. In particular, for
k′ we can choose nk′ 6= lk′ , because in the former case, any nk′ other than lk′ will
do, and in the latter case, the single nk′ with vknk′ = 0 must not be equal to lk′ ,
since vk′lk′ 6= 0. Define s−i ∈ S−i with components sknk ∈ Sk such that vkmk 6= 0
for all mk with skmk ∈ Sk − {sknk}, for all k ∈ I − {i, k
′}, and nk′ 6= lk′ . Then
p(s−i) =
N∏
k=1
k 6=i
dk∏
mk=0
mk 6=nk
vkmk 6= 0
by the choice of the nk’s. Since nk′ 6= lk′ , we have s−i ∈ S−i − {s
∗
−i}. So (V
s∗−ip
i,s−i
)
does not hold and the system (V
s∗−ip
i ) does not hold. 
Corollary 4. The system (Vi) holds if and only if either
N∨
k=1
k 6=i
dk∨
j=0
dk∨
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0) ,
or for some pure strategies skl ∈ Sk for each k ∈ I − {i} defining a (−i)-strategy
profile s∗−i ∈ S−i , we have
(vi0, . . . , vidi) = q(s
∗
−i),
vklk = 0 for each k ∈ I − {i},
and
vkmk 6= 0 for all mk 6= lk, for each k ∈ I − {i}.
Proof. This follows from our characterization of (Vi), Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. We
impose the condition
vkmk 6= 0 for all mk 6= lk, for each k ∈ I − {i}
in the latter alternative because otherwise, the former alternative holds. 
Suppose we have a solution of the system (V) in which the latter alternative
holds for some i ∈ I. As noted earlier, for a generic game, exactly one vij = 0 (the
one for which ui(sij , s−i)−ui(si0, s−i) attains its maximum, i.e., the one for which
ui(sij , s−i) is maximum) and the rest are zero. So the former alternative cannot
hold for any k ∈ I. Define li by vili = 0, and let s
∗ = (sili , s
∗
−i) ∈ S. For each
k ∈ I, the payoff uk(sklk , s
∗
−k) must be the maximum among uk(skl, s
∗
−k). Since
vkl 6= 0 for l 6= lk, we must have σkl = 0 for l 6= lk, so σklk = 1. That is, σ is the
pure strategy profile s∗. So this is the case of a pure strict Nash equilibrium s∗,
that is, one for which the pure strategy s∗k is a strictly better response to s
∗
−k than
any other pure strategy of k, for each k ∈ I.
Note well that this is a weaker condition than that s∗ be an equilibrium in
dominant strategies. For example, consider a game of two players who each can
take one of two actions, in which the payoff to each player is the same if they take
the same action and strictly less if they take opposite actions. This game has two
pure strict Nash equilibria, corresponding to both players taking the same one of
the two actions. But neither of the actions is a dominated strategy for either of the
players.
Suppose the latter alternative holds for some i ∈ I and both vij = 0 and vij′ = 0
for some j 6= j′. Then this makes the former alternative true for every k ∈ I − {i}.
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Finding pure strict Nash equilibria is a combinatorial procedure which does not
require any polynomial algebra. Therefore we do not discuss it further in this
article, but assume that we have already found all pure strict Nash equilibria (if
any exist), and are now interested in finding the other ones.
Proposition 5. Suppose σ is a Nash equilibrium of a generic game, and σ is not
a pure strict Nash equilibrium. Then there are two players i, k ∈ I with i 6= k and
two pure strategies each, sij0 , sij1 ∈ Si with j0 6= j1 and skl0 , sklk ∈ Sk with l0 6= l1,
such that ui(sij0, σ−i) = ui(sij1, σ−i) = ui(σ) and uk(skl0, σ−k) = uk(skl1, σ−k) =
uk(σ).
Proof. The first alternative in Corollary 4 must hold for each i ∈ I. Pick a player
n ∈ I. The condition
N∨
k=1
k 6=n
dk∨
j=0
dk∨
l=1
l>j
(vkj = 0) ∧ (vkl = 0)
means there is k 6= n and pure strategies skl0 , skl1 ∈ Sk with vkl0 = vkl1 = 0,
i.e., uk(skl0 , σ−k = uk(skl1 , σ−k) = uk(σ). This makes (Vm) hold for every player
m ∈ I−{k}. For k itself, the condition
∨N
i=1
i6=k
∨di
j=0
∨di
l=1
l>j
(vij = 0)∧ (vil = 0) means
there is i 6= k and pure strategies sij0 , sij1 ∈ Si with ui(sij0, σ−i) = ui(sij1, σ−i) =
ui(σ). 
In this case we cannot isolate σij0 and σij1 simply by looking at the best responses
for i, and similarly with k. We must solve the polynomial system (∗).
As noted before, at least one vnm must vanish for every n ∈ I. In the conditions
of the proposition, the least complex case is that exactly one vnm vanishes for each
n ∈ I − {i, k}, say vnmn ; that vij > 0 for j 6= j0 and j 6= j1; and that vkl > 0 for
k 6= k0 and k 6= k1. Then each player n ∈ I − {i, k} executes pure strategy snmk .
Furthermore i does not execute pure strategy sij with any probability for j 6= j0
and j 6= j1, and k does not execute pure strategy skl with any probability for l 6= l0
and l 6= l1. Then the system (∗) reduces to the system for a game with two players,
which we renumber as 1 and 2, with two pure strategies each, which we renumber
as s10, s11, s20, and s21. Write u
i
jl = ui(s0j , s1l). In this case the system (∗) is:
u100σ20 + u
1
01σ21 = u
1
10σ20 + u
1
11σ21,
u200σ10 + u
2
10σ11 = u
2
01σ10 + u
2
11σ11,
σ10 + σ11 = 1,
σ20 + σ21 = 1.
Substituting 1− σ11 for σ10 and 1− σ21 for σ20, we obtain
(u111 − u
1
10 − u
1
01 + u
1
00)σ21 = u
1
00 − u
1
10,
(u211 − u
2
10 − u
2
01 + u
2
00)σ11 = u
2
00 − u
2
01.
Notice that the equilibrium found by this system need not be totally mixed; for
instance, u100 − u
1
10 could equal zero, in which case σ2 = s20, or u
1
11 − u
1
01 could
equal zero. in which case σ2 = s21. (If they are both zero, then player 1 has no
control over player 1’s own payoff and hence every mixed strategy of player 1 is
a best response. So the requirement that 1 play a best response, which leads to
the first equation, does not impose any constraint on the strategy σ21 of player 2.)
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Similarly, u200 − u
2
01 could equal zero, in which case σ1 = s10, or u
2
11 − u
2
10 could
equal zero, in which case σ1 = s11. Both of these cases may even occur, in which
case the root of the system is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Any solution to the system (∗) induces a partition of P
def
=
⋃
i∈I Si into two sub-
sets, the subset P0 such that vij = 0 for all sij ∈ P0 and the subset P+ such that
vij > 0 for all sij ∈ P+. If we make a choice of such a partition, then σij = 0 for
all sij ∈ P+, so eliminating these strategies and considering the reduced game, the
system (∗) reduces to the system (E):
ui(sij , σ−i) = ui(si0, σ−i) for each i ∈ I and for j = 1, . . . , di, (Eij)
di∑
j=0
σij = 1 for each i ∈ I, (Ei0)
and all the σij ’s are nonnegative. (A root of the polynomial equations of the
system (E) which does not satisfy the nonnegativity constraints is called a quasi-
equilibrium.) After solving the system (E) to find a candidate σ, we have to check
that for each strategy sij of the original game which we had eliminated, vij =
ui(σ) − ui(sij , σ−i) is indeed nonnegative. In that case σ is a solution to the
original system (∗) and hence a Nash equilibrium of the original game. To find all
the Nash equilibria, we can perform this procedure for all partitions (P0, P+) for
which at least one snm ∈ P0 for each player n. As noted above, for a generic game
there will not be a Nash equilibrium for which there is exactly one player for which
at least two sij ’s are in P0.
From now on we will restrict our attention to solving systems of the form (E).
The paper [17] describes this system, which along with the constraints σij > 0 for
all the σij ’s, gives the totally mixed Nash equilibria. The Gambit software package
[18] finds all Nash equilibria recursively, by finding totally mixed Nash equilibria of
each reduced game by solving the corresponding system. This algorithm for finding
all Nash equilibria is described for example in [12] and in [6].
5. Solving An Instance of the Polynomial System
For any s ∈ S, with si = siji for each i ∈ I, we write
uij1...jN = ui(s1j1 , s2j2 , . . . , s(i−1)ji−1 , sij , s(i+1)ji+1 , . . . , sNjN )
−ui(s1j1 , s2j2 , . . . , s(i−1)ji−1 , si0, s(i+1)ji+1 , . . . , sNjN ).
In particular uij1...jN = 0 if ji = 0. Then the equation (Eij) is
d1∑
j1=0
· · ·
di−1∑
ji−1=0
di+1∑
ji+1=0
· · ·
dN∑
jN=0
uij1...ji−1jji+1...jNσ1j1 . . . σ(i−1)ji−1σ(i+1)ji+1 . . . σNjN = 0.
How do we solve an equation like this? We note in passing that if all the coefficients
uij1...ji−1jji+1...jN had the same sign, we would know that either all the monomials
vanished (i.e., σkl0 = σkl1 = 0 for some k ∈ I−{i} and 1 ≤ l0 < l1 ≤ dk), or σij = 0
and vij > vi0. However, this condition depends on the choice of which strategy in
Si to label as si0, so to check whether it ever arises would require checking the
difference between every pair ui(sij1 , s−i)− ui(sij0 , s−i).
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Well, if the equation factored, it would be easy to solve. That is, if we could find
numbers µ
(ij)
kjk
for k ∈ I − {i} and skjk ∈ Sk such that
d1∑
j1=0
· · ·
di−1∑
ji−1=0
di+1∑
ji+1=0
· · ·
dN∑
jN=0
uij1...ji−1jji+1...jNσ1j1 . . . σ(i−1)ji−1σ(i+1)ji+1 . . . σNjN
=
∏
k∈I−{i}
( dk∑
jk=0
µ
(ij)
kjk
σkjk
)
,
then we could solve the equation by setting
∑dk
jk=0
µ
(ij)
kjk
σkjk equal to zero for some
k ∈ I − {i}.
The factorization holds if and only if the coefficients of each monomial
σ1j1 . . . σ(i−1)ji−1σ(i+1)ji+1 . . . σNjN
on both sides of the equation are equal. The coefficient on the left-hand side is
uij1...ji−1jji+1...jN , and the coefficient on the right-hand side is
∏
k∈I−{i} µ
(ij)
kjk
. Thus
we have a system of equations
∏
k∈I−{i} µ
(ij)
kjk
= uij1...ji−1jji+1...jN . Equivalently
we have the system of linear equations
∑
k∈I−{i} log |µ
(ij)
kjk
| = log |uij1...ji−1jji+1...jN |
together with sign conditions
∏
k∈I−{i} sign(µ
(ij)
kjk
) = sign(uij1...ji−1jji+1...jN ). Unfor-
tunately this linear system is overdetermined and hence usually inconsistent. We
have
∏N
k=1
k 6=i
(di + 1) equations in only
∑N
k=1
k 6=i
(di + 1) unknowns µ
(ij)
kjk
. So in general,
equation (Eij) does not factorize.
Nevertheless, suppose all the equations (Eij) did factorize. How would we solve
the whole system (E) then? For one thing we would substitute σk0 = 1−
∑dk
jk=1
σkjk
into each linear factor
∑dk
jk=0
µ
(ij)
kjk
σkjk to get an affine linear factor
µ
(ij)
k0 +
dk∑
j=1
(µ
(ij)
kjk
− µ
(ij)
k0 )σkjk .
(“Affine” just means that it includes a constant term.) We set λ
(ij)
kjk
= µ
(ij)
kjk
− µ
(ij)
k0
for jk = 1, . . . , dk and λ
(ij)
k0 = µ
(ij)
k0 .
We will now construct a particular system in which all the equations factorize,
and solve that. For this purpose, it will be convenient to have available a totally
nonsingular matrix. An m×n matrix M = (mij) is totally nonsingular if for every
k ≤ min(m,n), for every subset R ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with |R| = k and every subset
C ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |C| = k, the k × k submatrix of M given by (mij) i∈R
j∈C
is
nonsingular.
Let f : N → R>0 be any injection of N into R>0. We can use the algorithm in
Figure 1 to construct a totally singular n× n matrix for any n. We start with the
1 × 1 matrix (m11) = (f(1)), which is clearly totally nonsingular. The problem of
filling in a matrix while maintaining some condition is called a matrix completion
problem. [25] shows that we can construct a totally nonsingular matrix by filling
in the entries one at a time, as in the above algorithm. In fact, at each stage
there are only finitely many possible values of the next entry which would violate
the condition, so all we have to do is avoid those values. Therefore each while
loop in the algorithm will always terminate. Since the partially filled-in matrix
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for i = 1 to n do
Invariant: Every submatrix of the partially filled-in matrix is nonsingular.
Invariant: The matrix is symmetric.
for j = 1 to i do
k ← i+ j − 2
mij ← f(k)
while some submatrix which includes mij is singular do
mij ← −mij
if mij > 0 then
We’ve already tried this value of mij , so try another
k ← k + 1
mij ← f(k)
end if
end while
mji ← mij
end for
end for
Figure 1. One Possible Algorithm To Compute A Totally Non-
singular Matrix
is symmetric, and mij does not violate the condition, setting mji = mij cannot
violate it either, and we can keep the matrix symmetric. For example, here is the
totally nonsingular 6× 6 matrix given by the above algorithm, with f(k) = 2k−1:


1 2 4 8 16 32
2 −4 16 −32 128 −256
4 16 −16 −128 1024 −256
8 −32 −128 −64 4096 4096
16 128 1024 4096 −256 1024
32 −256 −256 4096 1024 −1024


As a matter of fact, a random matrix will be totally nonsingular with probability
one. However, if we do use a random matrix we should check that it is indeed totally
nonsingular. Since checking this may take a long time, it may be useful to build a
large totally nonsingular matrix once and for all and keep it around.
Now assume we have a totally nonsingular D × D matrix M with entries mij .
Define n(i, j) = j +
∑i−1
k=1 dk. So if we write the equations (Eij) in sequence
(E11), . . . , (E1d1), . . . , (EN1), . . . , (ENdN ), then the n(i, j)th equation in the se-
quence is (Ei,j). Set λ
(ij)
klk
= mn(i,j)lk for lk > 0 and λ
(ij)
k0 = −1. This defines
a particular system (S) of equations which factorizes.
Notice that we don’t use allD2 entries ofM . For each player i, we use
∑
k∈I−{i} dk
rows and di columns of M . Thus we could just use a totally nonsingular matrix
with D −mini∈I di rows and maxi∈I di columns.
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For example, for a game of 3 players with 3 pure strategies each, using the above
6× 6 totally nonsingular matrix, we arrive at the system:
(σ21 + 2σ22 − 1)(σ31 + 2σ32 − 1) = 0,
(2σ21 − 4σ22 − 1)(2σ31 − 4σ32 − 1) = 0,
(4σ11 + 16σ12 − 1)(4σ31 + 16σ32 − 1) = 0,
(8σ11 − 32σ12 − 1)(8σ31 − 32σ32 − 1) = 0,
(16σ11 + 128σ12 − 1)(16σ21 + 128σ22 − 1) = 0,
(32σ11 − 256σ12 − 1)(32σ21 − 256σ22 − 1) = 0.
If we replaced the 1 in each factor by
∑dk
jk=1
σkjk and expanded out the polyno-
mials, we could determine for which payoff functions this is the system (Eij). For
instance, in the second equation the coefficient of σ22σ31 becomes −9, so this says
u1(s12, s22, s31) − u1(s10, s22, s31) = −9. The coefficient of σ20σ30 becomes 1, so
this says u1(s12, s20, s30)− u1(s10, s20, s30) = 1.
Now to find all the solutions to this system, we define a D × D matrix P by
Pn(i,j)n(k,l) = 0 if i = k and Pn(i,j)n(k,l) = 1 if i 6= k. In the example of a game
with 3 players, each with 3 pure strategies, we have
P =


0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0


We associate the n(i, j)th row with the equation (Eij) and the n(i, j)th column
with the variable σij . So an entry of P is 1 if and only if the corresponding variable
appears in the corresponding equation.
The reader is familiar with the determinant of a matrix, which is the sum of
certain signed products of entries of the matrix. The permanent of a matrix is the
sum of those same products of entries of the matrix, but without the signs. In other
words, for an D×D matrix P , the permanent of P is the sum over all permutations
τ of 1, . . . , D of the products
∏D
n=1 Pnτ(n).
To find a solution of (S), we pick D entries of P whose product contributes 1 to
the permanent of P . In other words, we pick a permutation τ of 1, . . . , D such that∏D
n=1 Pnτ(n) = 1. For example, the italicized entries below represent such a choice:

0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0


Now if τ(n(i, j)) = n(k, l), this tells us to make equation (Eij) hold by setting the
factor 1 +
∑dk
jk=1
λ
(ij)
kjk
σkjk equal to zero. In the above example, the above choice
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tells us to set:
σ31 + 2σ32 − 1 = 0,
2σ21 − 4σ22 − 1 = 0,
4σ11 + 16σ12 − 1 = 0,
8σ31 − 32σ32 − 1 = 0,
16σ11 + 128σ12 − 1 = 0,
32σ21 − 256σ22 − 1 = 0.
Now we have a system of di linear equations in the di variables σij , for each i. Since
we chose the coefficients from a totally nonsingular matrix, each system of di linear
equations has a unique solution. In this case, we find:
σ11 =
7
16
, σ12 = −
3
64
, σ21 =
21
32
, σ22 =
5
64
, σ31 =
17
24
, σ32 =
7
48
.
(Clearly this particular solution does not satisfy the nonnegativity constraints,
which we would also have to check if we were interested in the Nash equilibria
of this particular game.)
Notice that this procedure would give us the same set of equations multiple
times. For example, the choice of D other entries in P represented by the italicized
entries below:


0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0


gives the same system of equations. The problem is that for each set of di columns
corresponding to the variables σi1, . . . , σidi , we can apply any permutation to that
set of columns without affecting the meaning of our choice. So if we carried out
this procedure na¨ıvely, it would repeat each solution
∏
i∈I di! times. We should
avoid solving the same system twice. However, if we obtain the same solution from
a different choice of which factor in each of the equations to set to zero, then we
should perturb our totally nonsingular matrix so this doesn’t happen, for reasons
which will become clear later.
Carrying out this procedure, we find all 10 roots of (E). We list the values
of (σ11, σ12, σ21, σ22, σ31, σ32) below, along with the corresponding permutations of
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1, . . . , D:
(
3
64
,
1
512
,
3
4
,
1
8
,
3
16
,
1
64
)
5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 4(
7
32
,
3
128
,
21
16
,
−5
32
,
5
12
,
−1
24
)
, 4, 6, 1, 5, 2, 3(
17
96
,
7
384
,
21
16
,
−5
32
,
7
8
,
3
16
)
3, 6, 1, 5, 2, 4(
5
48
,
−1
192
,
129
160
,
31
320
,
5
12
,
−1
24
)
4, 5, 1, 6, 2, 3(
7
16
,
−3
64
,
129
160
,
31
320
,
7
8
,
3
16
)
3, 5, 1, 6, 2, 4(
7
32
,
3
128
,
33
80
,
−7
160
,
7
4
,
−3
8
)
4, 6, 2, 5, 1, 3(
17
96
,
7
384
,
33
80
,
−7
160
,
17
24
,
7
48
)
3, 6, 2, 5, 1, 4(
5
48
,
−1
192
,
21
32
,
5
64
,
7
4
,
−3
8
)
4, 5, 2, 6, 1, 3(
7
16
,
−3
64
,
21
32
,
5
64
,
17
24
,
7
48
)
3, 5, 2, 6, 1, 4(
3
16
,
1
64
,
3
64
,
1
512
,
3
4
,
1
8
)
3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2
We note that the first and last of these satisfy the nonnegativity constraints, and
hence are Nash equilibria. (The reader may notice some symmetries between pairs
of the solutions. This is because we happened to use the same region of M for all
the players.)
We can find the rest of the solutions of the system (∗) corresponding to this same
game too. Suppose we require vij to be positive instead of vanishing. Then the
variable σij goes away from every equation and the equation (Eij) is replaced by
the equation σij = 0. In the above example, suppose we require v31 to be positive.
Then we obtain a new system
(σ21 + 2σ22 − 1)(2σ32 − 1) = 0,
(2σ21 − 4σ22 − 1)(4σ32 − 1) = 0,
(4σ11 + 16σ12 − 1)(16σ32 − 1) = 0,
(8σ11 − 32σ12 − 1)(32σ32 − 1) = 0,
σ31 = 0,
(32σ11 − 256σ12 − 1)(32σ21 − 256σ22 − 1) = 0.
This system corresponds to the n(i, j), n(i, j) minor of M , which is also totally
nonsingular. We can use the same matrix P , but zero out the n(i, j)th row and
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n(i, j)th column and set the n(i, j), n(i, j) entry to 1. In our example:
P ′ij =


0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0


Now we follow the same procedure as above, performing the cofactor expansion
of the permanent along the n(i, j)th row. For example, the product of italicized
entries below contributes 1 to the permanent of this matrix:

0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0


The corresponding system is:
σ21 + 2σ22 − 1 = 0,
2σ21 − 4σ22 − 1 = 0,
4σ11 + 16σ12 − 1 = 0,
32σ32 − 1 = 0,
σ31 = 0,
32σ11 − 256σ12 − 1 = 0.
Its solution is:
σ11 =
17
96
, σ12 =
7
384
,
σ21 =
3
4
, σ22 =
1
8
,
σ31 = 0, σ32 =
1
32
.
This at least satisfies the nonnegativity constraints on the σij ’s. If we are interested
in the Nash equilibria of this game, we also have to check that it satisfies the
nonnegativity constraints on the vij ’s, namely, that v31 ≥ 0. We substitute the
σij ’s into
(16σ11 + 128σ12 − 1)(16σ21 + 128σ22 − 1),
the expected payoff to player 3 from playing σ31, obtaining
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2 , which is strictly
greater than zero. So this solution to the polynomial system is not a Nash equi-
librium, since s31 is a strictly better response to σ−3 than the value of σ3 given by
this solution.
In this way we see that our specially constructed factorizable game of a given for-
mat (N ; d1, . . . , dN ) contains subgames of every smaller format (N
′ : d′1, . . . , d
′
N ′),
with N ′ ≤ N and d′i ≤ di for each i, such that the subgames are also factorizable.
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As we will see, we only need to solve one (or a few) of the factorizable polynomial
systems for each format in the manner we have described so far.
Geometrically, by constructing the D × D totally nonsingular matrix M , we
picked D vectors in D-dimensional space, such that not only are these all distinct
points, but if we project any m of them onto any m-dimensional coordinate sub-
space, the images are all also distinct. The condition that two particular such images
coincide is an equation, which is satisfied only on a subset of real D-dimensional
space of strictly lower dimension. So every open subset of real D-dimensional space
does not satisfy the condition, almost everywhere. Since there are only finitely
many of these conditions, every open subset does not satisfy any of them, almost
everywhere. In particular, we could construct a totally nonsingular matrix such
that all the nonnegativity constraints of our factorizable game also held with strict
inequality. However, while this would provide an example of a game with the
maximal possible number of totally mixed Nash equilibria, it would not be particu-
larly relevant to the use we will be making of our specially constructed factorizable
games.
6. Polyhedra and Polynomial Systems
With a system of polynomial equations is associated a polyhedral subdivision, that is,
a polyhedron which is subdivided into cells, each of which is also a polyhedron, glued
together along their faces. We illustrate this for a game of 3 players with 2 pure
strategies each, since in this case the polyhedral subdivision is 3-dimensional. Using
the same totally nonsingular matrix, we obtain the following system of factored
equations:
(σ21 − 1)(σ31 − 1) = 0,(1)
(2σ11 − 1)(2σ31 − 1) = 0,(2)
(4σ11 − 1)(4σ21 − 1) = 0.(3)
Expanding this out, we obtain
σ21σ31 − σ21 − σ31 + 1 = 0,(4)
4σ11σ31 − 2σ11 − 2σ31 + 1 = 0,(5)
16σ11σ21 − 4σ11 − 4σ21 + 1 = 0.(6)
A monomial xα11 x
α2
2 · · ·x
αn
n in n variables can be represented by the lattice point
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ N
n of its exponents. For example, the lattice of monomials in two
variables x and y is depicted in Figure 2.
The Newton polytope of a polynomial equation is the convex hull of the lattice
points of the monomials occuring in that equation. In our example system in 3
variables σ11, σ21, and σ31, the Newton polytope of Equation 4 is depicted in
Figure 3, the Newton polytope of Equation 5 is depicted in Figure 4, and the
Newton polytope of Equation 6 is depicted in Figure 5.
The Minkowski sum of an n-dimensional polytope with vertices V01, . . . , V0m0
and an n-dimensional polytope with vertices V11, . . . , V1m1 is the convex hull of
the points V0i + V1j in n-dimensional space, for i = 1, . . . ,m0 and j = 1, . . . ,m1.
Figure 6 depicts the Minkowski sum of the Newton polytopes of Equation 4 and 5.
We can think of the Minkowski sum as translating one of the polytopes along each
edge of the other polytope. Here we have colored the vertices and edges as if we
first translated the red polytope along each edge of the green polytope. The red
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Figure 2. The Monomial Lattice in Two Variables
(0,0,0) (1,0,0)
(0,0,1)
(1,0,1)
σ21
σ11
σ31
Figure 3. The Newton Polytope of σ21σ31 − σ21 − σ31 + 1 = 0
(0,0,0)
(0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,1)
σ21
σ31
σ11
Figure 4. The Newton Polytope of 4σ11σ31 − 2σ11 − 2σ31 + 1 = 0
edges came from the original red polytope, and the green edges came from edges
of the green polytope along which we translated. Notice that we can do this in
more than one way. For example, we could have colored the vertices and edges as
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(0,0,0) (1,0,0)
(0,1,0)
(1,1,0)
σ21
σ11
σ31
Figure 5. The Newton Polytope of 16σ11σ31 − 4σ11 − 4σ31 + 1 = 0
Figure 6. Minkowski Sum of A Pair Of Newton Polytopes
if we translated the green polytope along each edge of the red polytope first. Such
a coloring of the Minkowski sum gives us a mixed subdivision, which in this case
has two cells, the two cubes in Figure 6.
Finally, the Minkowski sum of all three of our Newton polytopes is depicted in
Figure 7. A cell of a mixed subdivision is mixed if each color delineates only edges
(or possibly vertices) in the cell, not higher-dimensional faces. In Figure 7, the top
left front cube is not mixed, because two of its faces are green squares, and the
top right front cube is not mixed, because two of its faces are blue squares. We
see that two of the cells in this mixed subdivision are mixed. Each mixed cell tells
us how to obtain certain solutions to the factorizable polynomial system. Namely,
in each polynomial equation, we should look at the edges with the corresponding
color in the mixed cell, and set the factor(s) corresponding to the directions of
those edges to zero. In the game-theoretic case, there will be exactly one solution
corresponding to each mixed cell, since the polynomial system has degree at most
1 in any variable.
For example, Figure 8 depicts the bottom mixed cell of the mixed subdivision.
To find the solution corresponding to this mixed cell, we should set the factor σ21−1
to zero in the green Equation 1; we should set the factor 2σ31− 1 to zero in the red
Equation 2; and we should set the factor 4σ11 − 1 to zero in the blue Equation 3.
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Figure 7. Minkowski Sum of Three Newton Polytopes
σ21
σ11
σ31
Figure 8. One Mixed Cell of the Mixed Subdivision
This gives us the solution
σ11 =
1
4
, σ21 = 1, σ31 =
1
2
.
Figure 9 depicts the top mixed cell of the mixed subdivision. To find the solution
corresponding to this mixed cell, we should set the factor σ31 − 1 to zero in the
green Equation 1; we should set the factor 2σ11 − 1 to zero in the red Equation 2;
and we should set the factor 4σ21− 1 to zero in the blue Equation 3. This gives us
the solution
σ11 =
1
2
, σ21 =
1
4
, σ31 = 1.
In the game-theoretic case, the cells of the mixed subdivision are alwaysD-dimensional
cubes (or hypercubes). The matrix P in this example is
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0


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σ21
σ11
σ31
Figure 9. Another Mixed Cell of the Mixed Subdivision
Recall that the rows correspond to equations (and hence each will have a different
color), and the columns correspond to variables. A permutation which contributes
to the permanent will tell us how to color each variable. The edges of the mixed
cube going in the direction corresponding to that variable will be colored with that
color, and the linear factor containing that variable in that equation will be set to
zero.
7. Finding All Nash Equilibria by Polyhedral Homotopy
Continuation
We have taken considerable trouble to find all Nash equilibria of one particular kind
of specially constructed game. The good news is that once we have done this for
one particular game format, we can easily solve any generic game of that format.1
Furthermore, we can even more easily look for one or a few of the Nash equilibria,
look for Nash equilibria with some particular small support, and so forth. The key
idea is to “morph” the specially constructed polynomial system into the polyno-
mial system we are actually interested in. As we do this, the solutions to (E) for
the specially constructed game will also morph into solutions to (E) for the game
of interest. Moreover, this procedure is “embarrassingly parallel”. The morphing
of each solution is independent of the morphing of every other solution. We can
partition the solutions to (E) for the specially constructed game into subsets, and
hand each subset to a different processor. If somewhere along the way a morphed
solution begins to look disappointing (for example, it doesn’t look like it will end
up satisfying the nonnegativity constraints, or it starts to have an imaginary com-
ponent that we fear won’t go away), we can always stop morphing that solution
and come back to it later if more promising ones don’t pan out.
Readers may be familiar with the homotopy continuation method under the
guise of “tracing procedures”, such as the techniques of Lemke-Howson or Govin-
dan and Wilson. To solve a polynomial system by the homotopy continuation
1It’s not quite true that we only need to solve one game of each format. Something untoward
could happen on the way from this game to the one we are interested in; e.g., we could run into
a game whose set of Nash equilibria is positive-dimensional. So we should have the solutions to
a few of the specially constructed games ready to hand. We can make more such games by using
different regions of our totally nonsingular matrix.
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method, we create a family F of polynomial systems f1t = 0, f2t = 0, . . . , fmt = 0
parametrized by a variable t lying in [0, 1], such that the polynomial system we
want to solve is f11 = 0, f21 = 0, . . . , fm1 = 0, and the polynomial system f10 =
0, f20 = 0, . . . , fm0 = 0, called the starting system, is easy to solve. We consider
each polynomial system in F to lie in some topological space such that for any
particular point, the map of the polynomial space which evaluates the polynomial
at that point is continuous. We require the map from [0, 1] to this space to be
continuous, or in other words a homotopy. Now suppose (x1, . . . , xn) satisfies the
polynomial system f1t0 , . . . , fmt0 , and t1 is near t0. Since the homotopy is con-
tinuous, f1t1 , . . . , fmt1 must be near f1t0 , . . . , fmt0 , and so f1t1(x1, . . . , xn) must
lie near zero, f2t1(x1, . . . , xn) must lie near zero, and so forth. Therefore, since
polynomial functions are also continuous, we can look for a root of the system
f1t1 , . . . , fmt1 near (x1, . . . , xn). We make a prediction, i.e., we guess a possible
root of f1t1 , . . . , fmt1 near (x1, . . . , xn), and then a correction, i.e., we find an ac-
tual root near our guess, using Newton’s method for example. Once we have one,
we can proceed to the next iteration for t2 near t1, and so forth. At the end we
will have a path from our original root (x1, . . . , xn)t=0 to a root (x1, . . . , xn)t=1 of
the desired system. [13] presents a survey of previous uses of homotopy continu-
ation methods in game theory. The book [23] gives a recent survey of numerical
methods for solving polynomial systems, including detailed treatment of homotopy
continuation, and in particular polyhedral homotopy continuation.
If we fix the number of equations, and the Newton polytopes of each equation,
then the set of such polynomial systems becomes a vector space over the coefficient
field. Each monomial occurring in each equation corresponds to a basis element
of this vector space, and a particular polynomial system is uniquely specified by
giving the coefficients of all the monomials in all the equations. In particular, if the
coefficient field is R then this space of polynomial systems is a finite-dimensional
real vector space. Hence, it is equipped with a topology, the usual topology of such
spaces. We will call the number of equations together with the Newton polytopes of
each equation the shape of a polynomial system. Polyhedral homotopy continuation
is simply homotopy continuation among polynomial systems of the same shape. The
word “polyhedral” refers to the polyhedral subdivision introduced in the previous
section.
The Bernstein-Kouchnirenko theorem [2] [15] tells us that the number of 0-
dimensional complex roots, none of whose components are zero, of every generic
polynomial system of a given shape is the same. This number is called the Bernstein
number of the system. Polyhedral homotopy continuation [14] provides an alternate
constructive proof of this fact. Thus, if we apply polyhedral homotopy continuation
to a generic polynomial system we will find a unique (possibly complex) root of
the system in question at the end of each path leading from one of the roots of
the starting system. [17] applied the Bernstein-Kouchnirenko theorem to find the
number of complex roots of the polynomial system (E) for a generic game: it is
the permanent of the matrix P , divided by
∏
i∈I di!. In [6] we generalized this
theorem to polynomial systems obeying special conditions, such as those arising
from graphical games. Briefly put, the special conditions imply that some of the
entries in P are zero.
In general, the most difficult part of polyhedral homotopy continuation is com-
puting the mixed subdivision, finding a polynomial system which is generic, and
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using the mixed subdivision to find all the roots. Once all this is done, we can follow
a simple linear homotopy (i.e., of the form ft = (1 − t
k)f0 + t
kf1 for some k ≥ 1)
from this starting system to the desired system, which is relatively straightforward.
Therefore polyhedral homotopy continuation is particularly well-suited in the case
of game theory, since we know exactly how to find and solve a starting system.
The system (Eij) is an example of a multihomogeneous system. Every monomial
appearing in one of these equations has the same degree, namely 1, in all of player
1’s variables put together, the same degree, namely 1, in in all of player 2’s vari-
ables put together, and so forth. In the same way multihomogeneous systems are
generally easy to solve by polyhedral homotopy continuation. As we saw, adding
in the conditions (Ei0) does not make the problem more difficult, although it does
mean multihomogeneity no longer holds. The system (E) is a linear product family,
as described in Section 8.4.3 of [23].
We may not even need to find all the roots of the starting system before starting
to find the Nash equilibria of the desired game. Once we have a single root of the
starting system, we can start tracing it. However, if we are unlucky the correspond-
ing root of the desired game may not be nonnegative or even real, in which case we
will have to go find another root of the starting system to trace. [19] describes the
expected number of real roots of a random multihomogeneous system of polynomial
equations, and gives the lower bound as the square root of the Bernstein number
(the number of complex roots of a generic game).
Let’s expand out our factorizable polynomial system for the game of 3 players
with 3 pure strategies each.
σ21σ31 + 2σ21σ32 + 2σ22σ31 + 4σ22σ32
−σ21 − 2σ22 − σ31 − 2σ32 + 1 = 0,
4σ21σ31 − 8σ21σ32 − 8σ22σ31 + 16σ22σ32
−2σ21 + 4σ22 − 2σ31 + 4σ32 + 1 = 0,
16σ11σ31 + 64σ11σ32 + 64σ12σ31 + 256σ12σ32
−4σ11 − 16σ12 − 4σ31 − 16σ32 + 1 = 0,
64σ11σ31 + 256σ11σ32 + 256σ12σ31 + 1024σ12σ32
−8σ11 − 32σ12 − 8σ31 − 32σ32 + 1 = 0,
256σ11σ21 + 2048σ11σ22 + 2048σ12σ21 + 16384σ12σ22
−16σ11 − 128σ12 − 16σ21 − 128σ22 + 1 = 0,
1024σ11σ21 − 8192σ11σ22 − 8192σ12σ21 + 65536σ12σ22
−32σ11 + 256σ12 − 32σ21 + 256σ22 + 1 = 0.
We can make an input file for the polyhedral homotopy continuation software PHC
[26] which specifies this polynomial system. Since PHC orders the variables accord-
ing to the order they have appeared in the file, we will write the equations in the
reverse order from the system listed above, so that the variables will appear in the
order σ11, σ12, σ21, σ22, σ31, σ32. Here is the input file gameof3x3x3 start phc:
6
1 - 32*s11 + 256*s12 - 32*s21 + 256*s22
+ 1024*s11*s21 - 8192*s11*s22 - 8192*s12*s21 + 65536*s12*s22;
1 - 16*s11 - 128*s12 - 16*s21 - 128*s22
+ 256*s11*s21 + 2048*s11*s22 + 2048*s12*s21 + 16384*s12*s22;
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1 - 8*s11 - 32*s12 - 8*s31 - 32*s32
+ 64*s11*s31 + 256*s11*s32 + 256*s12*s31 + 1024*s12*s32;
1 - 4*s11 - 16*s12 - 4*s31 - 16*s32
+ 16*s11*s31 + 64*s11*s32 + 64*s12*s31 + 256*s12*s32;
1 - 2*s21 + 4*s22 - 2*s31 + 4*s32
+ 4*s21*s31 - 8*s21*s32 - 8*s22*s31 + 16*s22*s32;
1 - s21 - 2*s22 - s31 - 2*s32
+ s21*s31 + 2*s21*s32 + 2*s22*s31 + 4*s22*s32;
The first line specifies the number of equations, and the rest of the file specifies the
equations. Since an unknown can only consist of up to 5 characters, we denote the
variable σ11 by s11 in the file, and so forth.
We could find the roots of this factorizable system using PHC itself (in which
case we should tell PHC about the linear product structure of our equations), or
using other programs in the manner described above. We will list the 10 roots of
the starting system we found before in another input file for PHC, which we call
gameof3x3x3 start phc.roots. Here is the beginning of that file, including the
first two roots:
10 6
===========================================================
solution 1 :
t : 0.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 4.68750000000000e-02 0.00000000000000E+00
s12 : 1.95312500000000e-03 0.00000000000000E+00
s21 : 7.50000000000000e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s22 : 1.25000000000000e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s31 : 1.87500000000000e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s32 : 1.56250000000000e-02 0.00000000000000E+00
== err : 0.000E+00 = rco : 1.000E+00 = res : 0.000E+00 ==
solution 2 :
t : 0.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 2.18750000000000e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s12 : 2.34375000000000e-02 0.00000000000000E+00
s21 : 1.31250000000000e+00 0.00000000000000E+00
s22 : -1.56250000000000e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s31 : 4.16666666666667e-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s32 : -4.16666666666667e-02 0.00000000000000E+00
== err : 0.000E+00 = rco : 1.000E+00 = res : 0.000E+00 ==
The first line indicates that the file contains 10 solutions in 6 unknowns. Here t
denotes the homotopy parameter, and m denotes the multiplicity of each root. A
line such as
s11 : 4.68750000000000e-02 0.00000000000000E+00
indicates that at this solution, the variable s11 has real part .046875 and imaginary
part 0. The lines
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the solution for t :
and
== err : 0.000E+00 = rco : 1.000E+00 = res : 0.000E+00 ==
are lines that would have been included by PHC if it had written this solution file
itself, so we include them also even if we didn’t use PHC to generate these solutions.
Finally, we write an input file gameof3x3x3 phc with an example of another
polynomial system of the same shape, which we would like to solve:
6
1 - 2*s11 + 3*s12 - 5*s21 + 7*s22
- 7*s11*s21 - 5*s11*s22 - 3*s12*s21 + 2*s12*s22;
7 - 3*s11 - 5*s12 + 2*s21 - 3*s22
- 7*s11*s21 + 3*s11*s22 + s12*s21 - s12*s22;
3 - 5*s11 - 3*s12 - 2*s31 + 2*s32
+ 5*s11*s31 + 7*s11*s32 - 7*s12*s31 + s12*s32;
2 - 3*s11 - 5*s12 - 7*s31 + 7*s32
+ 5*s11*s31 + 3*s11*s32 - 2*s12*s31 - s12*s32;
1 - 2*s21 - 3*s22 + 7*s31 - 5*s32
- s21*s31 + 2*s21*s32 + 5*s22*s31 + 3*s22*s32;
1 - s21 + 2*s22 - 3*s31 - 5*s32
+ 7*s21*s31 - 2*s21*s32 + 5*s22*s31 + 3*s22*s32;
Now we can invoke PHC with the -p option, indicating that we already have a
starting system and its solutions.
$ phc -p
Welcome to PHC (Polynomial Homotopy Continuation) V2.3.16 25 Nov 2006
Polynomial Continuation defined by a homotopy in one parameter.
Reading the target polynomial system...
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc
Reading the name of the output file.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc.output
Do you want the solutions on separate file ? (y/n) y
Reading the name of the file to write the solutions on.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc.roots
Reading the name of the file for start system.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_start_phc
Reading the name of the file for the solutions.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_start_phc.roots
Homotopy is H(x,t) = a*(1-t)^k * Q(x) + t^k * P(x) = 0, t in [0,1],
with Q(x) = 0 a start system, and P(x) = 0 the target system.
At this point we are presented with several menus allowing us to change different
options for controlling the homotopy continuation. At each point we can enter 0
to accept the default options. Finally we are presented with:
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No more input expected. See output file for results.
and, possibly after some delay depending on how big our system is (in this case,
there is no noticeable delay), the program exits. Now we can look at the solution
file we specified gameof3x3x3 phc.roots:
10 6
===========================================================
solution 1 :
t : 1.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 5.52632039981343E-01 1.29171976073713E+00
s12 : -1.53240191264371E+00 -4.25943189689837E-01
s21 : 9.41581793200150E-02 -6.89962841355063E-01
s22 : 4.25278257933885E-03 1.43036622569914E+00
s31 : 2.32439674939101E-01 4.46695512464090E-01
s32 : -3.51970339164687E-01 2.04469018836310E-01
== err : 8.996E-16 = rco : 7.083E-02 = res : 7.383E-15 ==
We see that each component of this solution has a nonzero imaginary part. So this
solution is not of interest to us. Looking further down in the file, we see another
solution:
solution 3 :
t : 1.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 1.27522488578381E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
s12 : 7.45738698011832E-01 -3.26265223399926E-55
s21 : -1.04186142941727E-01 4.07831529249908E-55
s22 : -1.12076297688423E+00 6.52530446799852E-55
s31 : -5.09803187724616E-01 -1.02304887506437E-55
s32 : 4.44045922481355E-01 -2.65090494012440E-55
== err : 5.009E-16 = rco : 6.629E-02 = res : 3.664E-15 ==
Here the imaginary parts occurring in the various components are very small, and
could be due to numerical error. The eighth solution is similar. To test our hy-
pothesis, we make another file gameof3x3x3 phc.real roots in which we include
only these two roots, setting their imaginary parts to zero and renumbering them
in sequence:
2 6
===========================================================
solution 1 :
t : 1.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 1.27522488578381E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
s12 : 7.45738698011832E-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s21 : -1.04186142941727E-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s22 : -1.12076297688423E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
s31 : -5.09803187724616E-01 0.00000000000000E+00
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s32 : 4.44045922481355E-01 0.00000000000000E+00
== err : 5.009E-16 = rco : 6.629E-02 = res : 3.664E-15 ==
solution 2 :
t : 1.00000000000000E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
m : 1
the solution for t :
s11 : 6.39293179706243E-02 0.00000000000000E+00
s12 : -2.16568143357771E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
s21 : 4.93650795841189E+01 0.00000000000000E+00
s22 : -1.96619254862997E+01 0.00000000000000E+00
s31 : -6.49203588219902E-01 0.00000000000000E+00
s32 : -1.51339980038990E+00 0.00000000000000E+00
== err : 2.780E-13 = rco : 1.820E-05 = res : 1.670E-13 ==
Then we ask PHC to validate them by calling it with the -v option:
$ phc -v
Welcome to PHC (Polynomial Homotopy Continuation) V2.3.16 25 Nov 2006
Validation, refinement and purification of computed solution lists.
MENU with Validation Methods :
0. Scanning (huge) solution files and creating condition tables;
1. Basic Validation : refining and weeding out the solution set;
2. Evaluation of the residuals using multi-precision arithmetic;
3. Newton’s method using multi-precision arithmetic;
4. Winding-Number Computation by homotopy continuation;
5. Polyhedral Validation : frequency table of path directions;
6. Newton’s method with deflation for isolated singularities;
7. Multiplicity structure of isolated singular solutions.
Type 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 to select, or i for info : 2
Is the system on a file ? (y/n/i=info) y
Reading the name of the input file.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc
Reading the name of the output file.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc.validation_of_real_roots
Reading the name of the file for the solutions.
Give a string of characters : gameof3x3x3_phc.real_roots
Give the number of decimal places : 16
In this case we chose to evaluate each polynomial system at our candidate roots,
obtaining the residuals (the magnitudes of their images, which were supposed to
vanish). We look in the file gameof3x3x3 phc.validation of real roots for the
section beginning THE RESIDUALS:
THE RESIDUALS with 16 decimal places :
residual 1 : 1.2838672747E-14
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residual 2 : 6.530598545E-13
So we suspect that these roots are indeed real. Since they do not satisfy the
nonnegativity constraints, they are not Nash equilibria. (Note well that even if all
the components of a given solution were real and nonnegative, we would still have
to check that s11 + s12 <= 1, s21 + s22 <= 1, and s31 + s32 <= 1.)
Thus, we can compute a library of starting systems for games of various formats.
This initial computation may take a long time (indeed, computing the permanent
is NP -hard), but only has to be done once (or a few times) for games of each
format. Once we have done this, for any given game, we can look in the library for
an appropriate starting system along with its roots, parcel out the roots among the
processors we are using (possibly according to some heuristic scheme if we believe
some of them are more likely to lead to Nash equilibria), and hand the starting
system, the desired system, and the subset of roots to each processor.
If we wish, we can use interval computation along the path to each root to get
a verified bound on where the final root is. However, interval techniques become
computationally expensive in higher dimensions. For example, in D dimensions an
“interval” might be a box with 2D corners.
8. Solving Polynomial Systems Using Gro¨bner Bases
Recall that monomials correspond to points of the lattice Nn. A monomial order is
a total order  of Nn, such that for any α, β, γ ∈ Nn, if α  β then α+ γ  β + γ.
In other words, a monomial order is a total order which is compatible with addition
of the points in Nn, which corresponds to multiplication of monomials.
An example of a monomial order is the lexicographic order, which is defined as
follows. First define some ordering on the variables, e.g., xn  xn−1  · · ·  x2 
x1. Then the lexicographic order can be defined recursively on the number n of
variables: xαnn  x
βn
N if and only if α ≤ β, and x
α1
1 x
α2
2 · · ·x
αn
n  x
β1
1 x
β2
2 · · ·x
βn
n if
and only if either α1 ≤ β1, or α1 = β1 and x
α2
2 · · ·x
αn
n  x
β2
2 · · ·x
βn
n .
Suppose we are given two polynomials in n variables, f1(x1, . . . , xn) and f2(x1, . . . , xn).
The set of monomials occurring with nonzero coefficients in fi is the support Ai for
each i. (Recall that the Newton polytope is the convex hull of the corresponding
lattice points.) Using the lexicographic order, we can write the elements of Ai in a
unique way as mi0,mi1, . . . ,miji such that mi0 ≺ mi1 ≺ · · · ≺ miji . Then we can
write the polynomial equations as
f1(x1, . . . , xn) = aj1m1j1 + · · ·+ a1m11 + a0m10
and
f2(x1, . . . , xn) = bj2m2j2 + · · ·+ b1m11 + b0m10.
Here m1j1 is called the leading monomial of f1, αj1m1j1 is called the leading term
of f1, and αj1 is called the leading coefficient of f1, and similarly for f2.
Now that we have a definite order in which to write the monomials, we can
use long division to divide one polynomial by another. This is very much like
long division in arithmetic (in fact, in a sense, it’s easier, since there’s nothing
to guess). Suppose m1j1 = x
α1
1 x
α2
2 · · ·x
αn
n and m2j2 = x
β1
1 x
β2
2 · · ·x
βn
n . To divide
f1 by f2, we would write f1 and underneath it aj1b
−1
j2
x
α1−β1
1 x
α2−β2
2 · · ·x
αn−βn
n f2.
When this is not a proper polynomial because βj > αj for some j, i.e., the mono-
mial m2j2 does not divide m1j1 , we’re already done: the quotient is 0 and the
remainder is f2 itself. Otherwise, we subtract this from f1 and write a term
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aj1b
−1
j2
x
α1−β1
1 x
α2−β2
2 · · ·x
αn−βn
n in the quotient. The leading term of f1 cancels
out, and the leading monomial of the difference is strictly smaller. Then we repeat
this process again on this result, adding another term to the quotient, until either
we can’t use the leading term of f2 to cancel the leading term of the result, or the
result is zero. Then this last difference is the remainder, and we have written down
all of the quotient. The process has to terminate because the leading monomials
keep getting smaller and smaller.
Suppose that the two polynomial equations f1(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 and f2(x1, . . . , xn) =
0 hold. From these two polynomial equations we can derive some more polyno-
mial equations which are logical consequences of them. Let γi = max(αi, βi) for
i = 1, . . . , n, and write γ = (γ1, . . . , γn). Since aj1 6= 0 and bj1 6= 0, we have the
following equation:
a−1j1 x
γ1−α1
1 x
γ2−α2
2 · · ·x
γn−αn
n f1 − b
−1
j2
x
γ1−β1
1 x
γ2−β2
2 · · ·x
γn−αn
n f2 = 0.
Alternatively, we could use instead the equation
bj2x
γ1−α1
1 x
γ2−α2
2 · · ·x
γn−αn
n f1 − aj1x
γ1−β1
1 x
γ2−β2
2 · · ·x
γn−αn
n f2 = 0,
which does not require that aj1 6= 0 or bj2 6= 0. We have chosen the polynomials
with which to multiply f1 and f2 in order to cancel the leading terms of f1 and
f2. This polynomial is called the S-polynomial S(f1, f2) of f1 and f2. Clearly
S(f1, f2)(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 also.
Now we can divide S(f1, f2) by f1, getting an equation S(f1, f2) = q1f1 + r1
for polynomials q1 and r1, and then divide r1 by f2, getting r1 = q2f2 + r2 for
polynomials q2 and f2. (It is unfortunately the case that the final remainder r2
depends on the order in which we divided by f1 and f2.) We have that r2 =
S(f1, f2)− q1f1 − q2f2, so in particular, r2(x1, . . . , xn) = 0. Thus, if r2 is nonzero,
we have a logical consequence of our polynomial equations, and we can throw it
into our polynomial system. Our polynomial system is now {f1, f2, r2}.
Now if we repeat the process, taking S-polynomials of pairs of polynomials in
our new system and dividing each S-polynomial by all the polynomials in our new
system, we may find more polynomial equations to throw into the system. It is
a fact from commutative algebra that this process, called Buchberger’s algorithm,
will always terminate (i.e., finally all the remainders will be zero), and the (finite)
system we have at the end is called a Gro¨bner basis.
Gro¨bner bases have many nice properties, but what will be important to us for
solving polynomial systems is elimination theory. If we compute a Gro¨bner basis
of a polynomial system in the lexicographic order with xn  xn−1  · · ·  x1,
then those elements of the Gro¨bner basis involving only xn will tell us exactly what
polynomial equations in xn alone which are logical consequences of the polynomial
system. We can find the roots (if we prefer, only the real roots) of a polynomial
equation in one variable, which gives us the possible values of xn. Those elements
of the Gro¨bner basis involving only xn−1 and xn will tell us exactly the polynomial
equations in xn−1 and xn which are the logical consequences of the polynomial
system. We can substitute in the possible values of xn we got before, to get the
possible alternative polynomial equations that xn−1 alone could satisfy. Thus we
can get the possible values of (xn−1, xn). Continuing in this way, we can get all the
possible values of (x1, . . . , xn). If the system is positive-dimensional, we won’t be
able to do this n times. But the generic finiteness theorem of Harsanyi [11] tells
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us that a generic game has a finite number of Nash equilibria, i.e., the associated
polynomial systems are zero-dimensional.
Let’s use the software package Singular [10] to compute the Gro¨bner basis of a
game of 3 players with 2 pure strategies each.
~$ Singular
SINGULAR /
A Computer Algebra System for Polynomial Computations / version 3-0-2
0<
by: G.-M. Greuel, G. Pfister, H. Schoenemann \ July 2006
FB Mathematik der Universitaet, D-67653 Kaiserslautern \
> ring R=(0,u1100,u1101,u1110,u1111,u2010,u2011,u2110,u2111,
. u3001,u3011,u3101,u3111),(s10,s20,s30,s11,s21,s31),lp;
Here the second parenthesized expression gives the unknowns. As before we write
s10 for σ10 and so forth. In the first parenthesized expression, the first element
denotes the characteristic of the ring. To compute over the rational numbers Q
we set the characteristic to 0. The rest of the elements denote parameters. In this
case, the parameter u1ijk denotes u1(s1i, s2j , s3k)−u1(s10, s2j , s3k), the parameter
u2ijk denotes u2(s1i, s2j, s3k)−u2(s1i, s20, s3k), and so forth. Finally, lp means to
use the lexicographic order.
Next we specify our polynomial system:
> poly g1=u1100*s20*s30+u1101*s20*s31+u1110*s21*s30+u1111*s21*s31;
> poly g2=u2010*s10*s30+u2011*s10*s31+u2110*s11*s30+u2111*s11*s31;
> poly g3=u3001*s10*s20+u3011*s10*s21+u3101*s11*s20+u3111*s11*s21;
> poly g4=s10+s11-1;
> poly g5=s20+s21-1;
> poly g6=s30+s31-1;
Finally we ask Singular to compute a Gro¨bner basis:
> ideal G=g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6;
> G = groebner(G);
We ask Singular to display the Gro¨bner basis it computed:
> G;
G[1]=s30+s31-1
G[2]=s20+s21-1
G[3]=s10+s11-1
G[4]=(u1100*u2011*u3101-u1100*u2011*u3111-u1100*u2111*u3001+
u1100*u2111*u3011-u1101*u2010*u3101+u1101*u2010*u3111+
u1101*u2110*u3001-u1101*u2110*u3011-u1110*u2011*u3101+
u1110*u2011*u3111+u1110*u2111*u3001-u1110*u2111*u3011+
u1111*u2010*u3101-u1111*u2010*u3111-u1111*u2110*u3001+
u1111*u2110*u3011)*s21+
(u1100*u2010*u3111-u1100*u2011*u3111-u1100*u2110*u3011+
u1100*u2111*u3011-u1101*u2010*u3111+u1101*u2011*u3111+
u1101*u2110*u3011-u1101*u2111*u3011-u1110*u2010*u3101+
u1110*u2011*u3101+u1110*u2110*u3001-u1110*u2111*u3001+
u1111*u2010*u3101-u1111*u2011*u3101-u1111*u2110*u3001+
u1111*u2111*u3001)*s31+
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(-u1100*u2010*u3111-u1100*u2011*u3101+u1100*u2011*u3111+
u1100*u2110*u3011+u1100*u2111*u3001-u1100*u2111*u3011+
u1101*u2010*u3101-u1101*u2110*u3001+u1110*u2010*u3101-
u1110*u2110*u3001-u1111*u2010*u3101+u1111*u2110*u3001)
G[5]=(-u1100*u2011*u3011+u1100*u2011*u3111+u1100*u2111*u3011-
u1100*u2111*u3111+u1101*u2010*u3011-u1101*u2010*u3111-
u1101*u2110*u3011+u1101*u2110*u3111+u1110*u2011*u3001-
u1110*u2011*u3101-u1110*u2111*u3001+u1110*u2111*u3101-
u1111*u2010*u3001+u1111*u2010*u3101+u1111*u2110*u3001-
u1111*u2110*u3101)*s11+
(-u1100*u2010*u3001+u1100*u2010*u3011+u1100*u2011*u3001-
u1100*u2011*u3011+u1100*u2110*u3001-u1100*u2110*u3011-
u1100*u2111*u3001+u1100*u2111*u3011+u1101*u2010*u3001-
u1101*u2010*u3011-u1101*u2011*u3001+u1101*u2011*u3011-
u1101*u2110*u3001+u1101*u2110*u3011+u1101*u2111*u3001-
u1101*u2111*u3011+u1110*u2010*u3001-u1110*u2010*u3011-
u1110*u2011*u3001+u1110*u2011*u3011-u1110*u2110*u3001+
u1110*u2110*u3011+u1110*u2111*u3001-u1110*u2111*u3011-
u1111*u2010*u3001+u1111*u2010*u3011+u1111*u2011*u3001-
u1111*u2011*u3011+u1111*u2110*u3001-u1111*u2110*u3011-
u1111*u2111*u3001+u1111*u2111*u3011)*s21*s31+
(u1100*u2010*u3001-u1100*u2010*u3011-u1100*u2011*u3001+
u1100*u2011*u3011-u1100*u2110*u3001+u1100*u2110*u3011+
u1100*u2111*u3001-u1100*u2111*u3011-u1110*u2010*u3001+
u1110*u2010*u3011+u1110*u2011*u3001-u1110*u2011*u3011+
u1110*u2110*u3001-u1110*u2110*u3011-u1110*u2111*u3001+
u1110*u2111*u3011)*s21+
(u1100*u2010*u3001-u1100*u2010*u3011+u1100*u2010*u3111-
u1100*u2011*u3001+u1100*u2011*u3011-u1100*u2011*u3111-
u1100*u2110*u3001+u1100*u2111*u3001-u1101*u2010*u3001+
u1101*u2010*u3011-u1101*u2010*u3111+u1101*u2011*u3001-
u1101*u2011*u3011+u1101*u2011*u3111+u1101*u2110*u3001-
u1101*u2111*u3001-u1110*u2010*u3101+u1110*u2011*u3101+
u1110*u2110*u3001-u1110*u2111*u3001+u1111*u2010*u3101-
u1111*u2011*u3101-u1111*u2110*u3001+u1111*u2111*u3001)*s31+
(-u1100*u2010*u3001+u1100*u2010*u3011-u1100*u2010*u3111+
u1100*u2011*u3001+u1100*u2110*u3001-u1100*u2111*u3001-
u1101*u2010*u3011+u1101*u2010*u3111+u1110*u2010*u3101-
u1110*u2011*u3001-u1110*u2110*u3001+u1110*u2111*u3001+
u1111*u2010*u3001-u1111*u2010*u3101)
G[6]=(-u1100*u2010*u3111+u1100*u2011*u3111+
u1100*u2110*u3011-u1100*u2111*u3011+u1101*u2010*u3111-
u1101*u2011*u3111-u1101*u2110*u3011+u1101*u2111*u3011+
u1110*u2010*u3101-u1110*u2011*u3101-u1110*u2110*u3001+
u1110*u2111*u3001-u1111*u2010*u3101+u1111*u2011*u3101+
u1111*u2110*u3001-u1111*u2111*u3001)*s31^2+
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(2*u1100*u2010*u3111-u1100*u2011*u3111-
2*u1100*u2110*u3011+u1100*u2111*u3011-u1101*u2010*u3111+
u1101*u2110*u3011-2*u1110*u2010*u3101+u1110*u2011*u3101+
2*u1110*u2110*u3001-u1110*u2111*u3001+u1111*u2010*u3101-
u1111*u2110*u3001)*s31+
(-u1100*u2010*u3111+u1100*u2110*u3011+u1110*u2010*u3101-
u1110*u2110*u3001)
(We have reformatted the output.) The Gro¨bner basis has 6 elements. The first
three elements tell us how to find s10 in terms of s11, s20 in terms of s21, and
s30 in terms of s31. The last element G[6] is a quadratic polynomial in s31 alone.
We can solve this equation to find the possible values of s31. The fourth element
G[4] tells us how to obtain s21 once we have s31, and the fifth element G[5] tells
us how to obtain s11 once we have s31 and s21.
Any particular 2×2×2 game is specified by particular values of the parameters, so
we can just substitute them in and solve the resulting system. Having the Gro¨bner
basis gives us important information about how the geometry of the solution set
varies with the parameters. For instance, if the coefficient of s312 in G[6] vanishes,
then this polynomial only has degree 1 and hence only one real root. We can
consider the discriminant of the quadratic equation G[6]. Writing uis = ui(sij , s−i),
the discriminant becomes:(
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.
The set of payoff functions where the discriminant is zero is a real algebraic variety
in the space of 2 × 2 × 2 games, the discrimant variety. It partitions the space
of 2 × 2 × 2 games into a region where the discriminant is positive, in which case
the polynomial system has two real roots, and a region where the discriminant is
negative, in which case the polynomial system has no real roots.
The reader was already familiar with the discriminant of the quadratic formula,
but the same phenomenon will happen with equations of higher degrees in more
variables [9]. In this case there could be several discriminant varieties, with var-
ious implications about the geometry of the solution set. The SALSA team of
INRIA Rocquencourt and LIP6 in France has produced a Maple package DV which
will analyze the discriminant varieties for a parametric polynomial system [16],
36 RUCHIRA S. DATTA
and Antonio Montes [20] has independently produced another such Maple pack-
age DisPGB. (These analyze the implications of the discriminantal equations being
zero or nonzero for the complex solutions of the polynomial system. In the example
above, we considered in addition the implications of the discriminant being positive
or negative on the real solutions.)
Specifically, Gabriela Jeronimo, Daniel Perrucci, and Juan Sabia have recently
explained how to obtain a parametric representation of the totally mixed Nash equi-
libria. (As we know, this means we can get a parametric representation of all the
Nash equilibria by considering various possible supports.) They give polynomial-
time algorithms for describing the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria, using mul-
tihomogeneous resultants. The resultant of a polynomial system is a polynomial
equation in the coefficients of the system which must hold in order for the system
to have a root. Resultants are a key tool in the solution of polynomial systems.
The parametric equations characterize the geometry of the space of games and pro-
vide an effective method for finding all the roots. We look forward eagerly to the
implementation of these algorithms in a software package, which we hope will lead
to many new insights in game theory.
9. Finding All Nash Equilibria in Gambit
The Gambit software package incorporates a variety of tools for finding Nash equi-
libria and studying other properties of games. We will discuss here the version of
Jaunary 6th, 2006, which was the latest released version at the time of this writing.
The Gambit source includes a procedure to call the Pelican software for polyhedral
homotopy continuation which was written by Birk Huber [14]. However, as of this
release, although Gambit does use homotopy continuation for computing the logistic
Quantal Response Equilibrium correspondence, as well as the tracing procedures
mentioned above, it does not use polyhedral homotopy continuation to solve the
polynomial systems in order to enumerate all Nash equilibria. The Gambit source
also includes code to solve the polynomial systems by Gro¨bner basis techniques,
but Gambit does not actually use these either.
Pelican, written in 1995, is no longer actively maintained, so it’s not surprising
that Gambit doesn’t use it. There are now a few other packages for polyhedral
homotopy continuation, however, and Jan Verschelde continues to actively develop
PHC in particular. PHC also includes a C interface. Furthermore, the choice of a
factorizable starting system with manifest roots which we have described here avoids
the more delicate and computationally complex aspects of polyhedral homotopy
continuation, leading to an efficient solution method in practice.
The Gambit Gro¨bner basis code, which was written specifically for Gambit, was
abandoned due to “numerical instability”. Using Gro¨bner bases for numerical root
finding is indeed a delicate procedure, since computing a Gro¨bner basis at machine
precision involves many intermediate multiplication and division operations, which
makes it difficult to keep errors from accumulating beyond a tolerable level. Of
course, at the end one also has to find the roots of a univariate polynomial, but
many carefully written numerical libraries offer routines to do this. The bigger
problem is that after all the preceding computation to arrive at the Gro¨bner basis,
the coefficients of the univariate polynomial we’re solving may be wrong, giving us
a root which is wrong; the coefficients of the bivariate polynomial into which we
substitute the root of the univariate polynomial may also be wrong, giving us a
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root which is even more wrong; and so forth. It is for these reasons that we too
recommend Gro¨bner bases for geometric insight into how the structure of the set of
Nash equilibria may vary over the space of all games of a particular format, rather
than as a practical tool for finding all the Nash equilibria of one particular game.
By contrast, homotopy continuation is relatively more mature and well-understood
as a numerical technique.
Instead, Gambit solves the polynomial systems defining the Nash equilibria by
subdividing the product of simplices (where each simplex is the subset of Rdi defined
by σi1 + · · ·+ σidi = 1, σij ≥ 0 for all j) into small boxes and looking at the Taylor
series of each polynomial in the system. We can, for instance, evaluate the D
polynomials (f1, . . . , fD) at one corner σ of such a box, giving a vector (y1, . . . , yD).
Then any point in the box is no further than the diagonally opposite corner, and
we can plug this distance into the Taylor series of the polynomials about the corner
to determine a bound on how far the image of any other point σ′ of the box can lie
from (y1, . . . , yD). If this bound is less than ||(y1, . . . , yD)||2, then no point in the
box can be a root of the polynomial system. If it is not, then Gambit looks for a
root in the box using Newton’s method. If such a root is found, then Gambit tries
to see whether it can determine that no other roots may exist within the box, again
using the Taylor series of the polynomials. If it can, then it is done with this box,
but if not, then it subdivides the box into 2D smaller boxes and looks at those.
This method has the advantage that it will only find real roots which satisfy the
nonnegativity constraints. However, it does not scale well with higher dimensions.
Using polyhedral homotopy continuation with factorizable starting systems, find-
ing all Nash equilibria of games of much larger formats should become practical.
However, it may be useful to use a similar Taylor series technique on the augmented
system (the one including the variable t) along the way to each root of the target
system, to see whether we can derive a bound ensuring that the target root will not
be real and nonnegative (i.e., a Nash equilibrium). In that case we can abandon this
particular path. Here we are just travelling along a 1-dimensional interval [0, 1], so
the problem of having to subdivide into an exponential number 2D of smaller boxes
does not arise.
In this release Gambit provide an option to compute Nash equilibria via heuristic
search on the supports of the game [22], through an implementation contributed by
Litao Wei. Heuristic search is complementary to using polynomial algebra to find
Nash equilibria. It can tell us which of the many possible supports to look at first.
The choice of support tells us which polynomial systems to solve (possibly none, if
we find a pure Nash equilibrium on the support and are satisfied with not looking
any further).
10. Conclusion
In this paper we have described the polynomial systems which characterize the
Nash equilibria of a game. We have explained how to construct and solve a factor-
izable start system and then use polyhedral homotopy continuation to solve games
of a given format. We have also explained how to use Gro¨bner bases to gain insight
into how the geometry of the solution set of these polynomial systems varies over
the space of games of a particular format. Finally, we have reviewed the current
use of Gambit for finding all Nash equilibria of a game. We suggest that Gambit
may be able to find all Nash equilibria of games of larger formats than is currently
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possible, by incorporating polyhedral homotopy continuation from factorizable non-
degenerate start systems. Alternatively, or in addition, Gambit may implement the
algorithm of Jeronimo, Perrucci, and Sabia to find all Nash equilibria of a game.
We sincerely hope that the possibility of analyzing larger games will enable game
theorists to make more realistic models of strategic interaction.
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